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TORTS
William E. Crawford*
Contributory Negligence
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Cullen1 refused to hold that the plaintiff rail-,
road's leaving a switch unlocked, in violation of its own regulation, could amount to contributory negligence in its action for
damages against a boy who had thrown the switch open and
caused a derailment resulting in the damages suffered by the
railroad. The facts show that the defendant came upon the
unlocked switch, and after throwing it open, realized that a
train was coming and unsuccessfully attempted to return it to
its original position. The switch remained open just enough to
cause the derailment. The court found that the railroad's own
regulation required its personnel to keep switches locked to
prevent unauthorized persons from tampering with the switches.
and to keep vibrations from opening them. The regulation was
admittedly a safety regulation to prevent damage to the plain-.
tiff's property and employees.
The questionable point of the opinion is that, on the foregoing facts, the court said: "As the open switch did not violate
a legal duty owed by plaintiff to the two Cullen boys, the fact
that such a switch was a violation of a plaintiff regulation does
not constitute plaintiff negligence [sic] in this case and cannot
be used by the defendants to avoid liability for the tort committed by the boys."2 The court also stated that "[b]asically,
negligence resulting in liability in tort, and contributory negligence in tort cases, is the breach of a legal duty owed by a
litigant to an opposing litigant."
Both statements by the court are misconstructions of the
nature of contributory negligence. Negligence itself is the
breach of a standard of care owed to the injured party. The.
that a donation 4nter vivos produces no effect and does not form part of
the patrimony of the donee until it Is accepted by him in precise terms.
(LA. CIV. CODE art. 1540); collation is a purely personal action that can be
exercised only by forced heirs. LA. Civ. Cons art. 1235. A succession, on the
other hand, devolves upon the heir by operation of law immediately upon
the death of the de cujus, and a renunciation thereof constitutes an alienation. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1018.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 235 So.2d 154 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
2. Id. at 156-57.
3. Id. at 156.
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duty may be owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, but on the other
hand, the plaintiff may be under a duty to use a given standard
of care to avoid injury to himself and may violate that duty by
his own conduct. Classically, such a violation constitutes contributory negligence. When the plaintiff himself is the only
party injured, it is unnecessary and illogical to hold that contributory negligence must be based upon a duty owed by plaintiff to the opposing party.
The whole concept has been stated simply as follows:
"Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should
conform for his own protection and which is a legally contributing cause cooperating with the negligence of the de'4
fendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm."
There could be little argument that leaving the switch unlocked
was a substantial factor (cause-in-fact) in the derailment. Surely
the scope of duty owed by the railroad to avoid injuries by
keeping its switches locked included the avoidance of injuries
to itself and its property.5
An additional point of interest in the case is that the majority opinion found, in keeping with prior jurisprudence, that
a safety regulation of the railroad designed for its own operation
may be adopted by the court as the standard of care to measure
the conduct of the railroad in determining whether or not the
railroad was guilty of negligence. Even though the regulation did
not have the standing of a statute or ordinance, the court looked
with approval to the safety practices recommended by the railroad for its own operations. Whether the court will adopt such
regulations may vary according to the finding that the regulations articulate a reasonable standard of care for railroad
operations.
Latent Brake Falure
Latent brake failure was again held to be a defense to a
personal injury claim in Mallett v. State Farm Mutual Auto4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
5. Judge Domengeaux, in his dissent, said very much the same thing:
"The obvious negligence of the Company (through its employee or employees) in leaving such a potentially dangerous instrument unlocked
constitutes contributory negligence which Is a proximate cause of the
accident and should certainly bar its recovery." Illinois Central R.R. Co.
v. Cullen, 235 So.2d 154, 159 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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mobile Insurance Co.6 Judge Miller, writing for the majority,
correctly applied the existing rule of law as announced by our
supreme court. The contrary position was most persuasively
set forth by Judge Frug6 in his concurring opinion,7 in which he
also quoted from a concurring opinion by Justice (then Judge)
Tate wherein the latter decried the defense in an earlier latent
brake failure case declaring non-liability.8 In that same concurring opinion, Judge Tate advanced a statutory basis for finding liability in latent brake cases:
"By LSA-R.S. 32:341, subd. A (1962) our legislature
has provided that every motor vehicle 'shall be equipped
with brakes adequate to control the movement of and to
stop and hold such vehicle, including two separate means
of applying the brakes, each of which shall be effective to
apply the brakes to at least two wheels.' This statutory
duty, under its terms, is mandatory; it does not, applied
literally at least, admit of an avoidance by attempted but
unsuccessful compliance.
"Several states now hold the owner of a car with defective brakes to a strict liability for injuries thereby occasioned, regardless of personal negligence, reasoning that
the legislative requirement is mandatory that under no
circumstances should an automobile be operated on a state
highway without safe brakes ...
"In reaching the conclusion that strict liability should
apply, the rationale is available that an owner is presumed
as a matter of law to know of his defective brakes, because
of his statutory duty not to operate a vehicle without proper
6. 240 So.2d 413 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
7. "In the light of the legislatively imposed duty to operate a safe
vehicle; the appalling amount of damage and injury done to the innocent

victims of automobile accidents; and the increasingly dangerous propensities of automobiles and other motorized vehicles, can we continue to
ignore these innocent victims by supporting this jurisprudentially created
rule further?

"Should we not, on the other hand, turn our attention to another rule
of law which states that as between two innocent victims, the one by whose
action the wrong could have been prevented must bear the loss?" Id. at 416.
8. Quoting from Cartwright v. Fireman's Ins. Co. 213 So.2d 154, 156
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1968): "In the light of modern traffic conditions and our
crowded and urbanized society * * * certainly the better rule . . . would be

instead to apply a strict liability against owners who permit vehicles with
defective brakes-highly

dangerous instrumentalities,

whether the

defects

are latent or not-to be operated on the highways and to do harm to innocent
persons lawfully on or near the highway." Id.

at 416.
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brakes . . . or again, that one who engages in abnormally

dangerous activities (such as operating a car without
effective brakes) is held to strict liability for damages thereby occasioned . .

.-

It is an aberration of the entire thrust of tort law in automobile cases to force the innocent injured party to bear the
loss for the nonfunctioning of the defendant's brakes. The
standard of care to be expected of all motorists, to have functioning brakes, should be so high that nonfunctioning brakes
would be a conclusive presumption of the violation of that
standard, statutory or not, with some possible exceptions for
malicious or criminal acts destroying the brakes, or perhaps
an act of God intervening. It would not be necessary to adopt
the doctrine of strict liability as such if the statutory bases
cited by now Justice Tate were invoked.
Scope of Statutory Duty
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Pierrev. Allstate Insurance
on rehearing, held the defendant in a wrongful death action liable as insurer of an automobile illegally parked blocking
the lane of a highway in violation of the provisions of R.S.
32:143 (A) (14).11 Plaintiff's decedent was killed when the pickup truck in which he was riding stopped behind the illegally
parked car and was then struck from the rear by a third party
not keeping a proper lookout. Only the liability of the insurer
of the illegally parked car was at issue.
The trial court, the court of appeal,12 and the supreme court
in its original opinion, all held that the illegal parking was not
a proximate cause or a contributing factor to the accident,
because as noted by the court of appeal, "the accident would
have happened in the same way if decedent's driver had been
required to stop at the time he did stop or slow down his
forward progress for any other reason."' 18 Dixie Drive-It-YourCo.,10

9. Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 213 So.2d 154, 156-57 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion).
10. 257 La. 471, 242 So.2d 821 (1970).
11. "A. No person shall stand, or park a vehicle, except when necessary
to avoid conflict with other traffic, or in compliance with law or the directions of a police officer or traffic control device, in any of the following
places:
"(14) At any place where official signs prohibit such;"
12. Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 So.2d 846 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
13. 257 La. 471, 481, 242 So.2d 821, 825 (1970).
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self 1 4 was distinguished from the instant case on the theory that

the illegal parking by the offending truck in Dixie was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident, while the illegally
parked car in the instant case was not a substantial factor in
decedent's death, since the illegal parking did not render the
decedent's position of safety in the stopped pickup truck "any
more hazardous than it would have been had the parked truck
been required to stop on the highway for any other cause which
slowed or impeded the forward progress of the vehicles headed
15
southbound."
The original supreme court opinion held the violation of
the statute to be negligence per se, but then founded its denial
of plaintiff's cause upon absence of cause-in-fact. Clearly, the
issue was not cause-in-fact. There is no question that it was
the illegal obstruction which forced the decedent's driver to
come to a stop and thereby expose decedent to the very risk
which killed him. The true question in the case is whether the
statute violated by defendant extended its protection to the decedent against the risk of being struck from the rear while
stopped for the illegal obstruction.
It is in this context that the court reversed its position in
the opinion on rehearing and found in favor of the plaintiff. The
court, in a tightly reasoned opinion, found: (1) The illegal
parking and obstruction of the highway by defendant's insured
was a contributing cause-in-fact of the accident since it was not
necessary for the cause which stopped decedent's driver to place
decedent in a more hazardous position than he would have been
exposed to had the cause of the stopping been innocent. (2) The
highway statutes, R.S. 32:141 and 143 (A) (14), protect motorists
against risks from accidents brought on by the illegal blocking
of traffic lanes. (3) The negligence of the following truck driver
who crashed into the rear of the vehicle in which the decedent
was riding, while constituting a later and intervening negligent
cause, did not act as a superseding cause to the illegally parked
defendant.
The opinion on rehearing is unquestionably correct. It was
not a question of whether the illegal parking was a cause-in-fact
of the accident, but rather, was the statutory duty not to park
14. Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471,

137 So.2d 298 (1962).
15. 257 La. 471, 483, 242 So.2d 821, 826 (1970).
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illegally intended to burden the illegal parking with liability
for crashes caused in part by another tortfeasor. That is a classic
duty question in the form of a statutory interpretation and the
court wisely found that such liability was contemplated by the
statutes.
Vicarious Responsibility: Non-Imputation of Negligence
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Deshotel v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 16 held that a father's vicarious responsibility under
article 2318 of the Louisiana Civil Code 7 does not bar the father's
action for his own damages resulting from the negligence (or
contributory negligence) of his minor son. The noteworthiness
of the case lies in the clear distinction recognized by the court
between vicarious responsibility and imputed negligence. The
uniform jurisprudence of the courts of appeal of this state has
been that the responsibility of the father for the torts of his
minor child under article 2318 barred his action for damages
when his minor child was negligent in producing those damages. 18 The facts of the instant case are typical of earlier cases
involving the problem. The minor son was driving the family
automobile with the father as a passenger. The son was found
to be contributorily negligent in the ensuing accident which resulted in the father's personal injuries. Justice Barham correctly pointed out that, while article 2318 imposes financial responsibility on the parent for damages which a third party may
suffer from negligent injury by the child, that responsibility
is not synonymous with an imputation of negligence to the
parent.
While the instant case was a demand by the father for
damages arising from his personal injuries and redress was
claimed from his family insurer in a direct action, the opinion
points out that the action is not barred even in those cases
where the father is not present in the automobile but suffers
damage through medical expenses for his injured child or
16. 257 La. 567, 243 So.2d 259 (1971).
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2318: "The father, or after his decease, the mother,
are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or unemancipated
children, residing with them, or placed by them under the care of other
persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons.
"The same responsibility attaches to the tutors of minors."
18. See Funderburk v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 228 So.2d 169 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969) and cases cited therein.
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through repairs to the family automobile. 19 None of the earlier
jurisprudence explains why vicarious responsibility has barred
an action in the same fashion as contributory negligence. The
instant opinion gives an interpretation of article 2318 which is
completely sound.
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
"Actions for Damages .

.

. Suffered by the Husband"

The Digest of 1808 did not contain any specific provision on
the separate or community character of damages recovered by
either spouse for personal injuries. Presumably during the life
of that Digest, and consistently with the Spanish law of which
it was a digest, recoveries for personal injuries to either spouse
belonged to that spouse as separate assets. The Civil Code of
1825, however, introduced an "omnibus clause" into what is now
article 2334 of the current Civil Code, providing that "[c]ommon
property is that which is acquired by the husband and wife during marriage, in any manner different from that above declared
[to be separate property]." Under this clause, the judiciary
came to declare that amounts recovered for personal injuries
to either of the spouses entered the community of gains. Act 68
of 1902 amended article 2402 to read in part that "damages resulting from personal injuries to the wife . . . shall always be
...separate property of the wife." Then Act 170 of 1912 amended
article 2334 to read in part that "actions for damages resulting
from offenses and quasi-offenses [to the wife] ... are [the wife's]
separate property." Finally Act 186 of 1920 further amended
article 2334 in part to provide that "[a]ctions for damages resulting from offenses and quasi-offenses suffered by the husband,
living separate and apart from his wife, by reason of fault on
her part, sufficient for separation or divorce shall be his separate
property." From this time on, certainly there could be no doubt
that actions for damages for personal injuries to the wife occurring during the existence of the community of gains form part
of her separate patrimony, whereas similar actions for personal
injuries suffered by the husband during the community of gains
are common assets unless he has suffered the injuries while liv19. This holding was

accomplished

in

footnote

3 of

the

opinion by

expressly overruling Funderburk. 257 La. 567, 574, 243 So.2d 259,.261 (1971).
. Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

